INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of qualified immunity prevents government agents from being held personally liable for constitutional violations unless the violation was of "clearly established law." This doctrine rests on two pillars: its practical consequences and its technical legal justification.
There is a lot of research on the first pillar, the practical consequences of the doctrine. Does it insulate officials too much from liability, leaving them without adequate incentives to respect the constitutional rights of those they 12 These calls make it all the more important to figure out whether the modern doctrine of qualified immunity has a legal basis in the first place. 9. In this sense, this Article updates and corrects Jack Beermann's "critical analysis" of Section 1983 and qualified immunity, which concluded several decades ago that "legalistic analysis of § 1983" was largely "indeterminate." Jack M. This Article argues that it does not. Part I discusses the Court's three proffered justifications for qualified immunity, reconstructing the reasoning of each one and then explaining its legal flaws. Part II discusses the implications of this legal analysis going forward, with special attention to the Supreme Court's new elevation of qualified immunity to special certiorari status.
I. THE LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The statute colloquially known as "Section 1983," because it is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, makes liable state actors who violate constitutional or other legal rights. It was first enacted during Reconstruction as a section of the 1871 Ku Klux Act, part of a suite of "Enforcement Acts" designed to help combat lawlessness and civil rights violations in the southern states. The statute originally provided:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the provisions of the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixtysix, entitled "An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their vindication"; and the other remedial law of the United States which are in their nature applicable in such cases. 13 As currently codified in the U.S. Code, the statute provides: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
[https://perma.cc/6F9P-VCU5] (arguing that Congress "should narrow or abolish the doctrine of 'qualified immunity'").
13. An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for Other Purposes, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
14 Neither version of the text, you will notice if you wade through them, makes any reference to immunity. (The reference to the "same rights" and "other remedies" in the original statute pointed to the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which provided broad federal remedial authority, Supreme Court review, and presidential authority to direct prosecutions and use the military to enforce the Act.) 15 Yet that is not the end of the matter. Legal texts that seem categorical on their faces are frequently "defeasible"-that is, they are subject to implicit exceptions made by other rules of law. 16 "No vehicles in the park" might forbid ambulances from entering, but a separate rule of law may nonetheless provide an exception for government vehicles or for responses to an emergency. 17 Perhaps more to the point, legal provisions are often subject to defenses derived from common law. For example, the common-law rules of selfdefense, duress, and necessity can all apply to criminal statutes that do not even mention them. 18 Similarly, I have elsewhere defended the current doctrine of state sovereign immunity even though it, too, is an unwritten defense that goes almost unmentioned in the text of the Constitution. 19 So perhaps Section 1983 20 permits such an unwritten immunity defense despite its seemingly categorical provisions for liability.
To say that an unwritten defense can exist, however, is not to say that any particular unwritten defense is in fact legally justified. Such defenses come from other legal sources and must be justified on their own legal terms. That is 14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The equivalent federal cause of action has been subsequently supplied by federal common law, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) , and one might imagine that it would have produced distinct questions of unwritten immunity, cf. Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 548 (1982) . But so far, the Court has mechanically equated the two sets of immunities, Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999), so this Article will not consider them separately.
15 20. For ease of exposition and recognition, this Article refers to the statute anachronistically as "Section 1983"-not the Ku Klux Act, Section 1979, or its other nicknames-regardless of historical period.
why it is so important to understand the ostensible legal basis for qualified immunity. After disentangling the Court's many immunity cases, three possible bases for the doctrine surface.
The first, which is perhaps the most well known, is that qualified immunity derives from a putative common-law rule that existed when Section 1983 was adopted. 21 But this argument does not withstand historical scrutiny, and the Court has been inconsistent in adhering to it. If that argument fails, the cases suggest two alternative justifications that have not received enough notice. One is that qualified immunity is legitimate compensation for a different error the Court supposedly made earlier in construing the scope of Section 1983. The other is that qualified immunity derives from principles of fair notice analogous to the criminal law rule of lenity. Upon closer examination, none of these rationales can sustain the modern doctrine of qualified immunity.
Let us examine each one in turn.
A. The Historical Good-Faith Defense
To understand the first account of qualified immunity requires a few words about the historical transformation caused by Section 1983. Before the Civil War, suits for damages against government officials were not litigated directly as constitutional torts. Rather, constitutional claims emerged as part of a suit to enforce general common-law rights. As Akhil Amar has helpfully summarized, "Plaintiff would sue defendant federal officer in trespass; defendant would claim federal empowerment that trumped the state law of trespass under the principles of the supremacy clause; and plaintiff, by way of reply, would play an even higher supremacy clause trump: Any federal empowerment was ultra vires and void" because the defendant acted unconstitutionally.
22
(Such claims involved federal officials because until the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment few constitutional prohibitions of consequence applied to state officers.)
For instance, a New York merchant might bring a trespass action, demanding $100,000 against a U.S. military officer for taking command of his horses, mules, and wagons. The officer would respond that he had a lawful right to do so because of orders given as part of an authorized military action. The merchant would then respond that any such orders were unconstitutional under the Takings or Due Process Clauses, thus stripping the officer of his 21. Cf. Baude & Sachs, supra note 5, at 1133-34 (discussing idea of "adoption rules"). defense.
23
Constitutional rights were litigated through the procedural framework of general common-law torts, not as freestanding damages claims.
24
Section 1983 changed this framework. It created a direct cause of action against state officials for "the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution" 25 and thus eliminated the need to first allege a common-law claim or damages. In Hohfeld's terms, 26 most constitutional rights went from being treated as rules about power to being treated as duties.
27
As a result, Section 1983 raised questions about how the new constitutional claims related to the old common-law claims, and whether the common law had any role to play in the new constitutional suits.
The Court's Account
The most widely known theory of qualified immunity draws upon this historical background in a general way, arguing that the immunity is a common-law backdrop that could be read into the statute-like, perhaps, the absolute immunities of legislative and judicial officials. The theory creates the backdrop by drawing analogies to the rules that governed common-law torts.
The then ruled that the police should not be held liable under the Fourth Amendment for the 1961 arrests. Why? Because in a common-law suit for false arrest, "a peace officer who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable for false arrest simply because the innocence of the suspect is later proved," and that could arguably be extended to "excusing him from liability for acting under a statute that he reasonably believed to be valid but that was later held unconstitutional."
31
The newer constitutional tort, the Court held, should be read the same way:
[Section] 1983 "should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions." Part of the background of tort liability, in the case of police officers making an arrest, is the defense of good faith and probable cause. We hold that the defense of good faith and probable cause, which the Court of Appeals found available to the officers in the common-law action for false arrest and imprisonment, is also available to them in the action under [Section] 1983.
32
On its face, one might have expected this reasoning to be limited to false arrests or other torts with similar elements, but the Court rapidly expanded it to executive action generally.
33
One might also have expected this reasoning to support a subjective defense of good faith, but the Court has since transformed it into an objective analysis of "the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law."
34
In the course of transforming qualified immunity into its modern form, the Court did not always repeat this common-law "background" argument as frequently, perhaps because looking at the history would cause one to question the transformations.
35
But in Filarsky v. Delia 36 a more recent opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court invoked the common-law background once again, suggesting that it remains an important grounding for the legitimacy of the doctrine. In that case, the contested issue was immunity for those who work with the government without being its employees. The Court ruled that such immunity was largely available to non-employees, but before doing so went out of its way to reinforce the historical theory of immunity:
At common law, government actors were afforded certain protections from liability, based on the reasoning that "the public good can best be secured by allowing officers charged with the duty of deciding upon the rights of others, to act upon their own free, unbiased convictions, uninfluenced by any apprehensions." Our decisions have recognized similar immunities under § 1983, reasoning that common law protections "'well grounded in history and reason' had not been abrogated 'by covert inclusion in the general language' of § 1983."
37
Since the foundation of immunity had not been questioned by the parties, the passage's purpose is slightly unclear. The Court relied on history to answer the actual question presented (i.e., whether immunity should depend on employee status), 38 so it is possible that the Court needed to first reassert that history was a useful guide to this area. In any event, it is emblematic of the Court's approach to official immunities: purportedly, at least, official immunities must be grounded in some kind of construction of the statute in light of its history rather than justified on sheer policy consequences.
Preliminarily, note that the Court's references to common law here are concrete and historically fixed. The Court is not using common law in the Benthamite sense, as being "nothing but an alias for 'judge-made law. '" 39 Filarsky is thus consistent with the Court's previous insistence that " [ that incorporates the law of the relevant state, even though it has done so for other procedural issues. 45 
The Historical Problems
The Court's account of common-law qualified immunity has several historical problems. First, there was no well-established, good-faith defense in suits about constitutional violations when Section 1983 was enacted, nor in Section 1983 suits early after its enactment. Second, to the limited extent a good-faith defense did exist in some common-law suits, it was part of the elements of a common-law tort, not a general immunity. Third, qualified immunity today is much broader than a good-faith defense.
a. Legality Instead of Good Faith
As many scholars of official liability have pointed out, lawsuits against officials for constitutional violations did not generally permit a good-faith defense during the early years of the Republic. 46 A paradigmatic example is Chief Justice Marshall's 1804 opinion in Little v. Barreme, 47 in which naval Captain George Little mistakenly captured a Danish boat, The Flying-Fish, and was subsequently sued. 48 The Court thought it plain that federal law allowed the boat to be seized only if it was going to a French port, which it was not. 49 But President Adams had issued broader instructions to seize boats both going to and coming from French ports, which the Court sympathetically noted were "much better calculated to give [the law] effect," and without which it "was so obvious . . . that the law would be very often evaded." 50 The question in Captain Little's case was whether his reliance on the President's instructions could "excuse him" him from liability even though the seizure was unlawful.
51
The executive construction was a sympathetic one, and Chief Justice Marshall thought that the ship had been "seized with pure intention." 52 Nonetheless, the Court concluded, "the instructions cannot change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which without those instructions would have been a plain trespass." 53 In other words, good-faith reliance did not create a defense to liability-what mattered was legality.
A personal aside by Chief Justice Marshall helps show the deep roots of the legality principle. Before he ultimately acquiesced in the rule established by the Court, Marshall explained, "[T]he first bias of my mind was very strong in favour of the opinion that though the instructions of the executive could not give a right, they might yet excuse from damages."
54
Even then, Marshall imagined creating an excuse only because "a distinction ought to be taken between acts of civil and those of military officers; and between proceedings within the body of the country and those on the high seas." 55 In other words, even when Marshall was tempted to rule in favor of the military officer abroad, he recognized the general principle of liability for domestic violations by civil officials-the circumstances that describe almost every modern qualified immunity case decided by the Court.
56
As other scholars have noted, that "strict rule of personal official liability, even though its harshness to officials was quite clear," was a fixture of the founding era.
57
To be sure, the harshness was mediated by a related practice: during the antebellum period officials also regularly petitioned Congress for indemnification and "succeeded in securing indemnifying private legislation in 50. Id. at 178. 51. Id. The opinion refers to the seizure as "unlawful" rather than specifically "unconstitutional," though it certainly seems as though an unlawful seizure of a ship would have violated either the Fourth or Fifth Amendments (more likely the Fifth But that indemnification did not interrupt the courts' business of enforcing the law.
The original pattern of personal liability became more complicated over time, especially when the government officials were sued for common-law torts without constitutional claims.
59
Even so, one could still find cases applying the founding-era principles throughout the nineteenth century. For instance, in 1891, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, through Justice Holmes, held that members of a town health board could be held liable for mistakenly killing an animal they thought to be diseased, even when government commissioners had ordered the killing.
60
More importantly, after Section 1983 was enacted, the Court specifically rejected the application of a good-faith defense to constitutional suits under that specific statute. The key case is Myers v. Anderson, where the Court held that a state statute violated the Fifteenth Amendment's ban on racial discrimination in voting.
61
The case was brought under Section 1983, and the state officials argued, among other things, that they could not be liable for money damages if they had in good faith thought the statute constitutional.
62
Section 1983, they claimed, was intended to preserve "traditional limits" such as a common-law requirement "that malice be alleged" in voting rights cases.
63
The Court did not spend much time rejecting this argument in its opinion, but it did reject it. The Court observed that "[t]he nonliability in any event of the election officers for their official conduct is seriously pressed in 58. Pfander In other words, there was no good-faith defense.
While the Court did not elaborate, it is possible that the Court thought that the text of Section 1983 did not permit unwritten defenses at all. It is also possible, however, that the Court agreed with the lower court's analysis upholding liability. The lower court had been slightly more specific in denying the good-faith defense:
The common sense of the situation would seem to be that, the law forbidding the deprivation or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race or color being the supreme law, any state law commanding such deprivation or abridgment is nugatory and not to be obeyed by any one; and any one who does enforce it does so at his known peril and is made liable to an action for damages by the simple act of enforcing a void law to the injury of the plaintiff in the suit, and no allegation of malice need be alleged or proved.
66
This is exactly the logic of the founding-era cases, 67 alive and well in the federal courts after Section 1983's enactment. It was not until later in the twentieth century that the Court first grafted a good-faith defense to the constitutional cause of action.
b. Not a Freestanding Defense
This problem with the Court's qualified immunity doctrine is well known. That is why in Filarsky and earlier cases the Court did not point to a good-faith defense from constitutional causes of action but rather from common-law causes of action. But there is an additional problem. Even to the extent that these cases could be imported to the cause of action under Section 1983, they generally do not describe a freestanding common-law defense, like state Instead, those cases mostly describe the individual elements of particular common-law torts.
This distinction is important because an element of a specific tort does not provide evidence of a more general backdrop that one would expect to export to other claims, let alone from common law to constitutional claims. For instance, a Fourteenth Amendment antidiscrimination claim requires the plaintiff to demonstrate discriminatory intent by the defendant.
69
But it does not follow that intent-let alone discriminatory intent-is an element of a due process claim. 70 Similarly, bad faith and flagrancy were simply elements of certain torts brought against public officials. It did not follow that they were elements of all torts or all constitutional claims against public officials.
For instance, one of the earliest Supreme Court cases to discuss the negative effects of damages against officers in close cases is the admiralty decision The Marianna Flora.
71
In that case, the Court declined to "introduce a rule harsh and severe in a case of first impression." 72 However, the Court considered these harsh effects when defining the substantive rules of capture, which were within the Court's general powers of "conscientious discretion" 73 specially applicable to its admiralty jurisdiction. The Court tethered its reasoning to specific facts about rules of capture in admiralty, not to a general defense.
The role of good faith as an element of specific torts, rather than as a defense, is even more apparent in Pierson, where the Court pointed to the elements of the false arrest tort at common law.
74
The Court cited the Second Restatement of Torts, which described a "privilege[] to arrest," 75 an Eighth Circuit case arising in diversity that applied Missouri law consistent with the Second Restatement, 76 and a torts treatise to similar effect. 77 Interestingly, Prosser's 1941 treatise, a few pages after the portion cited in Filarsky, notes using the present tense that "courts are being driven slowly" to 68. Sovereign immunity, which keeps states from being sued without their consent, is "a background rule of procedure like waiver or precedent or capacity to sue" that applies regardless of the substance of the suit. See Baude, supra note 19, at 8-9.
69. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976 evolution Prosser describes almost entirely post-dated the enactment of Section 1983. Only two of the cases he cited were from before 1871, one on each side of the immunity question, suggesting that any good-faith defense was protean and contested at best.
80
To be sure, because some constitutional doctrine itself borrows concepts or rules from the common law, it is possible to envision the elements of an individual common-law tort in that garb. But that should occur on the merits side of the ledger; there is no justification for reading it into the statutory remedy.
c. The Mismatch Problem
Finally, even if one were to grant the existence of a good-faith defense and import it to constitutional claims, modern immunity cases have distorted those common-law rules to a troubling degree. First, qualified immunity is now applied "across the board" to all constitutional claims-and perhaps to statutory claims as well 81 -regardless of "the precise character of the particular rights," 82 rather than being limited to the kinds of claims where good faith was traditionally relevant. Second, instead of the subjective inquiry into intent or motive that marked the good-faith inquiry, qualified immunity has become an objective standard based on case law. Third, as this Article will discuss in more depth, qualified immunity's objective defense has become increasingly protective, outstripping other comparable defenses 85 and leading the Court on the kind of pro-immunity crusade that it normally reserves for legal edicts like the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Federal Arbitration Act. 86 While the Court may not cop to the full force of these historical critiques, some Justices have acknowledged elements of them. For instance, in 1992 Justice Kennedy complained that "qualified immunity for public officials" had "diverged to a substantial degree from the historical standards." 87 He specifically noted that it was "something of a misnomer to describe the common law as creating a good-faith defense; we are in fact concerned with the essence of the wrong itself, with the essential elements of the tort." 88 Justice Kennedy found these deviations problematic because immunity doctrine is supposed to be "rooted in historical analogy, based on the existence of common-law rules in 1871, rather than in 'freewheeling policy choice [s] . '" 89 Joining a dissenting opinion six years later, Justice Thomas also endorsed a historical criticism of qualified immunity, observing that "our treatment of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has not purported to be faithful to the common-law immunities that existed when § 1983 was enacted, and that the statute presumably intended to subsume." 90 And just last term, Justice Thomas wrote for himself to observe that "[i]n further elaborating the doctrine of qualified immunity for executive officials . . . we have diverged from the historical inquiry mandated by the statute" and "have not attempted to locate that standard in the common law as it existed in 1871." 91 But perhaps there is another justification. Indeed, both of these Justices have also joined many of the Court's qualified immunity decisions. While the historical justification for qualified immunity has attracted the most attention and controversy, the Court's opinions contain two alternative legal rationales. Each of these rationales is sufficiently plausible to warrant consideration on its own terms. Let us turn to them next. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented. Justice Scalia did not really maintain that the pleading standard could be justified on its own terms but instead argued instead that while qualified immunity might be wrong, it was a wrong justified by an earlier wrong in interpreting the statute. 93 Our qualified immunity jurisprudence is inconsistent with the intended meaning of the statute, Justice Scalia conceded. 94 But qualified immunity operates as a defense to the scope of liability under Section 1983, and we have so misinterpreted Section 1983 that qualified immunity is a fair enough response.
Here is the critical paragraph:
[O]ur treatment of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has not purported to be faithful to the common-law immunities that existed when § 1983 was enacted, and that the statute presumably intended to subsume. That is perhaps just as well. the Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for constitutional damages against federal officers, analogous to the Section 1983 cause of action against state officers. In subsequent cases about the scope of the Bivens action, Justice Scalia repeatedly and uniformly refused to recognize it. He did not attempt to justify these votes on Bivens's own terms, but rather on the grounds that Bivens was a mistake. Because there was no statutory basis for the Court's original decision (there was and is no statute equivalent to Section 1983 for federal officers), he dismissed Bivens as a "relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action," an approach it had since "abandoned." 99 Under this theory of qualified immunity, it does not matter whether the doctrine can be justified on first principles. It is a judicially invented immunity for a judicially "invented" statute. 100 Two wrongs, Justice Scalia might have said, can make a right. 101 
The "Under Color of" Problem
This second theory suffers from two legal deficiencies. The first problem is that Justice Scalia's premise-that Monroe v. Pape was wrongly decidedappears to be wrong. ). Moreover, his position in Monroe has an intuitive appeal: many things that are unconstitutional are also illegal as a matter of state law. The Constitution does not let officers break into your house and harass you for no reason, but neither does battery law or the code for the use of force. So when an officer acts contrary to both the law of Illinois and the Constitution, does he really act "under color" of the law of Illinois?
This position makes sense, and one can see why Justices Scalia and Frankfurter might have held it as a hypothesis 109 -it was my initial hypothesis as well. The problem is that there is historical reason to doubt it. Section 1983 provides liability for those who act "under color of" state law-not merely "under" it or "consistent with" it-and it turns out that "under color of" is a longstanding legal term that encompasses false claims of legal authority.
As Steven Winter has recounted, the usage goes back more than 500 years, when an English bail bond statute voided obligations taken by sheriffs "by colour of their offices" without complying with a statutory procedure. The English court concluded that to act "by colour of" one's office (or "colore officii sui") included an illegal act. The phrase "signifies an act badly done under countenance of an office, and it bears a dissembling visage of duty, and is properly called extortion." There is also evidence that the original framers of the Ku Klux Act understood the phrase in its traditional sense. Professor David Achtenberg has argued that there is circumstantial confirmation from the way the statute was drafted: Representative Shellabarger oversaw the insertion of the phrase "under color of" to replace the phrase "under pretense of."
112
Yet Shellabarger was more radical than the previous drafter, and his changes consistently broadened the availability of relief, so it seems unlikely that "under color of" was supposed to be more limited than "under pretense of," the phrase that it replaced.
113
To be sure, Justice Scalia likely would not have cared about drafting history that is inconsistent with the apparent meaning of the text, but he did give weight to an established meaning of legal terms of art.
114
In his Crawford-El dissent, Justice Scalia implied that his skepticism was bolstered by a more practical intuition that Monroe v. Pape had wrought a radical change to the meaning of Section 1983. As quoted above, he described Monroe as having "changed a statute that had generated only 21 cases in the first 50 years of its existence into one that pours into the federal courts tens of thousands of suits each year," 115 implying that the vast rise of constitutional torts in the second half of the twentieth century was proof that Monroe was wrongly decided. Some commentary by Monroe's supporters furthers the impression that the case was revolutionary.
116
Let us put aside the point that Justice Scalia's numbers may be overstated: in the first fifty years there were fewer cases of all kinds, and Justice Scalia did not tell us the fraction of early Section 1983 suits. and not until 1949 that the Court confirmed that "the core of the Fourth Amendment" was incorporated.
119
Even if one thinks-as I do-that incorporation was commanded by the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, 120 it is still true that incorporation was not well received in the courts. 121 Thus, it is little surprise that there weren't as many suits.
The Mismatch Problem
There is a second and more important problem with Justice Scalia's argument that two wrongs make a right. Even if we accept its premise as true, the results ought to be nothing like the modern regime of qualified immunity. If Justice Frankfurter was right about Monroe v. Pape, the resulting immunity ought to be nearly the opposite of the immunity regime we now have.
To see why, we must first reconstruct Justice Frankfurter's position, on which Justice Scalia relies.
122
As a first approximation, Justice Frankfurter thought that an official acts "under color of" state law when his conduct is authorized by that law, and not when it is illegal.
123
But Frankfurter's position had some additional subtleties. In many cases it will be unclear exactly whether a given course of conduct is legal under state law. In other cases it is possible that conduct will be unauthorized as a matter of the written statutes, but nonetheless permitted as a practical matter. And Section 1983 cares about unwritten law just as written law, since it treats "customs" or "usages" the same as "statutes." federal forum when states refuse to do so for self-interested reasons, and thus moves closer to the oft-recited (though sometimes breached) principle that "every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress."
132
The "under color of" state law requirement then withholds that forum where it would be redundant with state tort law.
Frankfurter's position does not yield modern qualified immunity doctrine, nor does it require any federal immunities. A government's grant of immunity is a sign that the officer is acting partly under the authority of that government. Thus, immunities in state law are used as a trigger for liability.
Rather If anything, modern qualified immunity does the opposite of what it ought to under the Frankfurter position. As discussed in Part I.A., qualified immunity comes closer to tracking state common law than it does to filling in state law's gaps. Frequently, an official who acts egregiously and in bad faith is potentially liable under both state tort law and constitutional doctrine; an official who acts mistakenly but in good faith will be liable under neither one.
To be sure, the power of this criticism depends a lot on how brutal a compensating adjustment is allowed to be.
133
If one looks with a wide enough lens, one might say that it's enough that the first decision erroneously expanded the number of lawsuits and the second decision will decrease the number of lawsuits.
But this isn't and shouldn't be a well-accepted theory of compensating adjustments. First, with the lens that wide nearly every doctrine of constitutional law and civil procedure would be swept in. The theory would not provide special justification for the doctrine of qualified immunity. Second, to the extent that the original scheme had an animating purpose or logic, one would expect the adjustment to be consistent with that purpose. For instance, it would be a far closer approximation to the Frankfurterian scheme to require that Section 1983 claims be exhausted 134 or to substantively alter the doctrine for certain kinds of constitutional claims (like excessive force claims, perhaps).
135
For sophisticated proponents of compensating adjustments, there are plenty of hard questions about how to choose among possible compensating adjustments.
136
But for present purposes, it is enough to say that only an extremely crude theory could justify the Court's current qualified immunity jurisprudence.
137
C. The Lenity Theory
The Court's Account
That leaves us with the oldest of the Court's justifications for qualified immunity, one based in lenity. It derives from cases that read a related enforcement provision in light of the need for fair warning, and later extended similar principles to Section 1983.
Section 1983 is not the only Reconstruction-era statute that enforces constitutional rights against state officials. In addition to the civil rights suits authorized by Section 1983, Congress passed a criminal prohibition toobeginning with the 1866 Civil Rights Act, and then modified to include the language of the Ku Klux Act. 136. Vermeule, supra note 96, at 433-34 (footnotes omitted) ("A standard conceptual objection is that the policy of adjustment is indeterminate, as the interpreter may choose the margin on which the adjustment is made. If sweeping delegations produce excessive presidential power, why adjust by upholding the legislative veto, as opposed to, say, granting Congress the commander-in-chief power?").
137. Id. at 434 ("Here as elsewhere in constitutional interpretation, however, the indeterminacy point is only partly persuasive; there are easy cases for second-best constitutionalism as well as for first-best interpretive theories. If the growth of omnibus legislation has undermined the veto power, we need no elaborate theoretical apparatus to appreciate that permitting the (otherwise suspect) line-item veto is a more fitting compensating adjustment than, say, making the veto immune from congressional override.").
138 That provision does not contain any written defenses, aside from what can be read into the requirement of a "willful" mens rea. But once again, that does not mean that no defenses exist.
Criminal prosecution under this statute can raise a genuine problem of notice. The statute criminalizes a violation of constitutional rights, and everybody can easily read the Constitution for themselves. But as John Marshall reminded us, the Constitution does not "partake of the prolixity of a legal code." The fair notice problem is mitigated as we let judges expound and clarify the legal meaning of the Constitution's terms. Yet since the interpretations can change and are subject to contestation, a rule of narrow construction provides some leeway to those who could not fairly anticipate a change in judicial doctrine.
These principles animated the Court's early decision in United States v. Screws.
141
There, the Court reviewed the conviction of three Georgia officials who were prosecuted under the contemporary version of Section 242 for beating a handcuffed man to death. Two of the Justices were inclined to affirm the convictions.
142
Three others thought a federal conviction was not legally possible.
143
That left Justice Douglas writing the plurality, and likely controlling, opinion. The statute might be unconstitutional, the plurality conceded, if it were read to broadly criminalize any violation of "a large body of changing and uncertain law," especially under the Due Process Clause.
144
But the statute could be "confined more narrowly" and therefore withstood the charge of vagueness.
145
That narrower interpretation had two parts. First the statute required a "willful" act, which could be interpreted "as connoting a purpose to deprive a person of a specific constitutional right." 146 But that alone did not solve the problem if "neither a law enforcement official nor a trial judge can know with sufficient definiteness the range of rights that are constitutional." 147 So the specific intent had to be still more specific: to refer not just to constitutional rights but to rights made "definite by decision or other rule of law." Because that new construction was inconsistent with the jury instructions, the plurality voted to remand for a new trial. That meant a three-way split on the proper disposition, with different Justices affirming, reversing with no new trial, or remanding with a new trial. To avoid a "stalemate," Justice Rutledge agreed to vote for a remand for a new trial under the plurality's opinion, rather than stick with his first choice to affirm.
150
This likely turned the plurality's opinion into the controlling opinion, and it has since been adopted by the full Court.
151
The exact character of the "fair warning" 152 limiting construction was a little ambiguous. One might describe it as the rule of lenity favoring narrow construction of criminal statutes. One might instead describe it as a distinct rule that broad constructions of the criminal law cannot be applied retroactively. Or one might describe it as a rule that vague criminal statutes are unconstitutional, which the statute should be construed not to be. Indeed, the Court has since said that all three of those descriptions are "related manifestations of the fair warning requirement" applied to Section 242.
153
These cases provide the final potential grounding for the doctrine of qualified immunity. The theory of lenity and fair warning imagines a state official as akin to a criminal defendant in need of special solicitude before being punished.
Modern qualified immunity doctrine does not usually mention the criminal rule of lenity, and one might have expected it to be limited to criminal cases. But in some opinions, the Court has equated the two. It has explicitly said that "[o]fficers sued in a civil action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have the same right to fair notice as do defendants charged with the criminal offense defined in 18 U.S.C. § 242." 154 And in its most recent decision about the scope of criminal liability under Section 242, the Court has confirmed the connection, stating that "in effect the qualified immunity test is simply the adaptation of the fair warning standard to give officials . . . the same protection But once one is looking for it, the lenity connection may also explain some of the Court's elaborations of the qualified immunity standard. For instance, when the Court says that only "the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law" can be held liable, 157 it seems to be adverting to criminal recklessness or deliberate wrongdoing. When the Court says that the Fourth Amendment is not enough to clearly establish the unreasonableness of most violations of the Fourth Amendment, 158 it seems to be adverting to the problem of criminal vagueness in light of the fact that the Constitution is not written out as a legal code. Qualified immunity seems to rest on an intuition that officials are not to blame for reasonable mistakes.
But does this justification actually support modern immunity doctrine? Some of its premises are legally sound: criminal prohibitions should be read in light of longstanding legal and interpretive principles, and constitutional avoidance and lenity are such principles. And yet . . .
The Civil/Criminal Problem
One could fairly have more misgivings about importing the limited construction of the criminal statute to the civil one.
To be sure, the Court has sometimes applied the canonically criminal "rule of lenity" in civil cases, if the same language has parallel application in a criminal case. For instance, the Court in U.S. v. Thompson/Center Arms Co. confronted "a tax statute that we construe now in a civil setting" but applied the rule of lenity because the statute also had "criminal applications." 159 This rule tracked some language in previous tax cases. 160 The Court has since done the same thing when defining "aggravated felony" for purposes of the immigration laws, reasoning:
Although Moreover, there is also an important textual difference between the two civil rights provisions. Section 242 applies only to those who "willfully" violate constitutional rights, while Section 1983 contains no such limitation. In Thompson, the plurality hinted that this was a relevant distinction, pointing out that the tax statute at issue there "has criminal applications that carry no additional requirement of willfulness." 163 Indeed, the Court made a similar point about the two civil rights statutes in Monroe v. Pape, specifically noting:
In the Screws case we dealt with a statute that imposed criminal penalties for acts "willfully" done. We construed that word in its setting to mean the doing of an act with "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right." We do not think that gloss should be placed on [ § 1983] which we have here. The word "willfully" does not appear in [ § 1983 .] Moreover, [ § 1983 ] provides a civil remedy, while in the Screws case we dealt with a criminal law challenged on the ground of vagueness. Section [1983] should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.
164
While this passage is somewhat opaque, it and Thompson cut against the application of the criminal rule of lenity to Section 1983. We could also consider the related doctrine of constitutional fair warning. To the extent that the fair warning principle derives from the Constitution's Due Process Clause, due process is required both for deprivations of liberty (as in many criminal cases) and for deprivations of property (as in civil actions for damages). However, criminal prosecutions have generally been thought to present distinct fair-warning concerns that do not apply to civil statutes. As the Court has put it: "The standards of certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is higher than in those depending primarily upon civil sanction for enforcement." 166 However, a more recent case, FCC v. Fox, may have blurred that line because it applied criminal vagueness precedents in a civil case. 167 Thus, it is possible that qualified immunity doctrine under Section 1983 could be justified on fair notice and lenity principles, but that would require some extension of the current version of those principles.
The Mismatch Problem
Even if we grant that Section 1983 falls within the domain of lenity and fair notice, there is a less lofty reason that those principles cannot justify qualified immunity doctrine: Qualified immunity doctrine has come to bear little practical resemblance to the rules applicable to criminal defendants.
Consider how the Court treats judicial disagreement in both the criminal and qualified-immunity contexts. Many cases in the Supreme Court have been subject to a "circuit split," meaning that the lower courts have disagreed. When judges disagree, that might be a clue that the legal question is hard and the materials are ambiguous. 168 If the materials are ambiguous, that is reason to favor the criminal defendant or official. But the Court treats qualified immunity and the ordinary criminal defendant in almost the opposite fashion. 169 Indeed, the Court has explicitly rejected the relevance of circuit splits to the lenity inquiry, stating that "we [have not] deemed a division of judicial authority automatically sufficient to trigger lenity."
170
When faced with a defendant who asked for a fair notice defense because his circuit had established precedent construing a criminal statute more narrowly, the Court said no: reliance on this precedent was "unavailing since the existence of conflicting cases from other Courts of Appeals made review of that issue by this Court and decision against the position of the respondent reasonably foreseeable."
171
People regularly go to jail over this issue. In the past few years, for instance, the Court has ruled for the government in at least seven substantive criminal law cases where a lower court had adopted the defendant's position. 172 In none of those cases did it apply the rules of lenity or fair warning or suggest that the division was relevant.
173
In Section 1983 cases, by contrast, a circuit split is considered a strong point in favor of the official. Indeed, those cases come close to establishing that a circuit split is a per se defense of the official's conduct in circuits where the issue was unsettled. In Wilson v. Layne, for instance, the Court concluded that police officers had violated the Fourth Amendment by inviting members of the press to tag along during a home search.
174
But the Court also concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, noting that the question was "by no means open and shut" 175 and that the officers had reasonably relied on established policy. It closed with an invocation of the fair notice principle in light of judicial disagreement:
Between the time of the events of this case and today's decision, a split among the Federal Circuits in fact developed on the question whether media ride-alongs that enter homes subject the police to money damages. If judges thus disagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for picking the losing side of the controversy. 173. Johnson v. United States, which invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act as vague, is a rare case that mentions "numerous splits among the lower federal courts" as a point in the defendant's favor. 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560 (2015). But it is still a far cry from the kind of near-dispositive relevance they get in qualified immunity cases. Indeed, the Court wrote that "[t]he most telling feature of the lower courts' decisions is not division about whether the residual clause covers this or that crime (even clear laws produce close cases); it is, rather, pervasive disagreement about the nature of the inquiry one is supposed to conduct and the kinds of factors one is supposed to consider." Id. (emphasis added).
174. 526 U.S. 603, 609-14 (1999). 175. Id. at 615. 176. Id. at 618 (internal citations omitted).
That passage turned out to be an important part of Wilson, which provided a shield for law enforcement officers to claim that judicial disagreement should give them immunity from constitutional tort.
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In Safford v. Redding, the Court again held that officials had committed a Fourth Amendment violation, albeit in the very different context of a strip search of a 13-year-old girl suspected of possessing Ibuprofen at school.
178
The Court held, although guardedly, that qualified immunity nonetheless attached because of the state of judicial disagreement:
We would not suggest that entitlement to qualified immunity is the guaranteed product of disuniform views of the law in the other federal, or state, courts, and the fact that a single judge, or even a group of judges, disagrees about the contours of a right does not automatically render the law unclear if we have been clear. That said, however, the cases viewing school strip searches differently from the way we see them are numerous enough, with well-reasoned majority and dissenting opinions, to counsel doubt that we were sufficiently clear in the prior statement of law.
179
The Court has continued to find immunity on the basis of judicial disagreement. For instance, it quoted Wilson again in Reichle v. Howards.
180
It then held in Lane v. Franks that a defendant was entitled to qualified immunity even though other circuits had (correctly) held his conduct unconstitutional, because the defendant was allowed to ignore those decisions and rely on his own circuit's (erroneous) precedent. In some other cases, the Court has hinted at going farther, suggesting that even where a circuit decision in the relevant circuit had clearly established that an action was unlawful, officials might still be justified in treating that opinion with skepticism until the Supreme Court has weighed in.
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While the Court has not (yet?) treated judicial disagreement as the source of a per se immunity, the difference between the Court's treatment of immunity analysis and of ordinary criminal cases is stark. Criminal defendants never get such solicitude.
If the only legal basis for qualified immunity doctrine is as an extension of the lenity and fair warning principles, then the doctrine needs to be radically overhauled. The Justices regularly empathize with officials subject to suit, asking if the official can really be expected to anticipate constitutional rulings that even federal appellate judges did not. But one rarely sees a similar empathy for regular criminal defendants, and indeed the Court's decisions do not bear it out.
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Thus the lenity theory, while in some respects the most obscure, might be the best path to some kind of immunity. But it seems to justify a much more modest immunity doctrine than the one we have, one that at most, tracks the modest defenses available to real criminal defendants.
D. What Immunity Can Be Justified?

Justifying Qualified Immunity?
Close inspection suggests that something has gone wrong, as a legal matter, in the Court's immunity doctrine. But it is not the case, as more extreme accounts have suggested, 185 that Section 1983 permits absolutely no immunities at all because the text is categorical on its face. Unwritten defenses are not unknown to the law. The real problem with qualified immunity is that it is so far removed from ordinary principles of legal interpretation.
To be sure, this assessment of qualified immunity depends on how much freedom judges have in interpreting law. If one takes a very freewheeling view, one could decide that one of the Court's theories provides an adequate seed for some kind of immunity, and that such an immunity can then be reshaped at the Court's will, even in very dramatic ways. But I doubt that judges have such 1003 (1995 broad power under the norms that are (mostly) observed by our legal system. 186 In any event, if this is the way to justify qualified immunity, it emphasizes how much the immunity doctrine is a product of the Court's own choices and not ordinary posited law. Exposing the Court's choices lets us make a clearer and more responsible decision about whether those choices are the right ones or whether, having given us such a categorical immunity doctrine, the Court should now take some of it back.
Similarly, it is possible that the Court could put forward an entirely new legal argument for qualified immunity. Maybe Section 1983 could be reconceived as a common-law statute analogous to the Sherman Antitrust Act. 187 Of that statute, the Court has concluded that Congress "expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate" 188 by "recognizing and adapting to changed circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience." 189 The Court has so far denied a similar kind of adapting role in creating immunities under Section 1983. 190 An ambitious interpreter might also try to justify qualified immunity as an application of the absurdity doctrine, which rejects interpretations that "would produce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended."
191
Even accepting the validity of the absurdity doctrine, 192 it seems counterintuitive at best to say that Congress could not have intended a regime without qualified immunity, given the historical periods in which we got by without it. 193 In any event, the Court has not attempted this path either. Finally, the Court might attempt to justify immunity on purely functional grounds. Its cases already put forward some functional justifications for immunity, noting that it "free[s] officials from the concerns of litigation, including 'avoidance of disruptive discovery,'" that fear of being sued will 'dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties. '" 195 So far, though, the Court has used more traditional legal arguments as the opening wedge for these policy concerns. If the statute and its background principles do not authorize this immunity, the Court would have to assert a more freestanding justification.
What all of these hypothetical interpretive approaches have in common is that they would more explicitly foreground the live policy debates about whether qualified immunity is wise or useful and about how it interacts with other aspects of our legal regime such as indemnification, sovereign immunity, and doctrinal change.
196
It is far from clear that qualified immunity would survive those debates unscathed. So perhaps qualified immunity doctrine can be made lawful, though I doubt it, and in any event that question ought to preoccupy us far more than it does.
Justifying Other Immunities
Finally, it may well be that some of the other immunities recognized by the Court's cases stand on substantially firmer footing. For instance, the Court's cases recognizing state sovereign immunity are basically correct (or at least, I have so argued).
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It is possible that some official immunities, such as the absolute immunity given to judges for their judicial acts, could also be justified.
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Cases decided nearly contemporaneously with Section 1983's enactment support judicial immunity. In 1869, the Court affirmed judicial immunity in a state disbarment suit, opining that "it is a general principle applicable to all judicial officers, that they are not liable to a civil action for any judicial act done within their jurisdiction." 199 The Court reaffirmed that rule again in 1872, the year after Section 1983 was enacted.
200
The rule evidenced by these cases might well support something like the doctrine of judicial immunity. These immunity cases do require some extrapolation; it has been argued that the legislative history of Section 1983 rejects absolute judicial immunity. of qualified immunity does not necessarily imperil these other immunities, which might have their own firmer historical and legal bases.
II. IMPLICATIONS
A. Qualified Immunity Doctrine
Suppose it is true that the Court's proffered justifications for qualified immunity are shaky and that it does not hold up under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. What should actually happen to modern qualified immunity doctrine?
The most obvious possibility is that the Court could overrule or modify the doctrine. This possibility is obvious in the sense that it is straightforward, not in the sense that the Court is likely to do it. A doctrine's lack of a legal basis is a necessary condition for overturning it, but it is not a sufficient one.
Under orthodox rules of stare decisis, the Court might be extremely reluctant to overturn qualified immunity, even if it is wrong. The Court is generally extremely reluctant to overturn statutory precedents, 202 and qualified immunity seems to be a largely statutory precedent. In statutory cases, the argument goes, Congress is fully capable of overruling precedent and is the better agent to do so. 203 Because qualified immunity has been on the books for years and Congress has declined to revisit it, it may have obtained a belated Congressional imprimatur. 204 But qualified immunity doctrine seems unorthodox in several respects. First, it is not entirely clear that the Court views qualified immunity as a purely statutory rule, as opposed to a constitutionally protected one. 205 The lenity rationale for qualified immunity has some constitutional overtones, and the early arguments rejected in Myers v. Anderson invoked constitutional considerations.
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Apart from the lenity rationale, qualified immunity and other official immunities do generally appear to be common-law rules, and Congress normally can change the common law. 207 But one might have anticipated the same thing about sovereign immunity, which the Court held Congress is largely powerless to abrogate. 208 And when the Court held that legislative immunity survived Section 1983, it said it was willing to "assume, merely for the moment, that Congress has constitutional power to limit the freedom of State legislators acting within their traditional sphere." But, it added, "[t]hat would be a big assumption." 209 Despite these constitutional shadows, one can and probably should distinguish qualified immunity from these other immunities. Nevertheless, they are enough to show a path by which the Court might say that qualified immunity is not a purely statutory doctrine left to the pleasure of Congress. Indeed, Felix Frankfurter argued that reconsidering the interpretation of Section 1983 was "the Court's responsibility" because it was not "merely a mine-run statutory question," but rather one that "has significance approximating constitutional dimension." These points may not show that qualified immunity is fundamentally unstable, but they suggest that the Court takes more ownership of it than more orthodox statutory doctrines.
Even if the Court refuses to overrule qualified immunity, it might tinker with the doctrine more incrementally. Some suggest that this has already happened, arguing that after Harlow the Court reformulated the qualified 207. Once again, see supra note 99, I bracket the possibility that there are distinct limits on Congress's power to regulate the qualified immunity of federal officials. immunity to subtly strengthen it, 214 or that the Roberts Court is now doing the same thing. 215 The Court could cut back on some of the excesses of qualified immunity in similar fashion. As Richard Re has pointed out, when a line of doctrine points in a problematic direction, it is highly traditional to "narrow" it, 216 leaving its roots intact while refusing to allow new branches to take their natural course. Justice Kennedy has suggested such an approach in the qualified immunity context.
217
B. The Qualified Immunity Docket
Setting aside formal and informal tinkering with the doctrinal formula of qualified immunity, 218 there is another important aspect of qualified immunity that might call for reconsideration: the Supreme Court's special treatment of qualified immunity issues on its certiorari docket. There are two aspects to that special treatment, both of which seem to be getting more special in recent years.
First, nearly all of the Supreme Court's qualified immunity cases come out the same way -by finding immunity for the officials. In the thirty-five years since it announced the objective-reasonableness standard in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court has applied it in thirty qualified immunity cases. 217. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 171 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("We need not decide whether or not it was appropriate for the Court in Harlow to depart from history in the name of public policy, reshaping immunity doctrines in light of those policy considerations. But I would not extend that approach to other contexts.").
218. Cf. Fallon, supra note 6, at 494 (claiming "that formula has remained relatively untouched in recent decades").
219. See Appendix. For simplicity, the appendix omits some additional cases concerning qualified immunity that were decided only on procedural grounds and without application of the clearly established standard. See, e.g., Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1868 (2014) (reversing because of "a clear misapprehension of summary judgment standards" and declining to "express a view as to whether Cotton's actions violated clearly established law"); Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996) (finding a right to interlocutory appeal but leaving the lower court the task of determining whether the summary judgment evidence "met the Harlow standard of 'objective legal reasonableness'"). The other, Malley v. Briggs, dates back to 1986, and ordered a remand after rejecting, inter alia, an officer's argument that so long as he does not lie, "the act of applying for a warrant is per se objectively reasonable." 223 Neither Hernandez nor Malley went so far as to actually find a violation of clearly established law.
This asymmetry may have an important effect on how qualified immunity operates. The Court regularly reminds lower courts that "clearly established law" has to be understood concretely. It is not enough to say that the Fourth Amendment is clearly established and therefore all Fourth Amendment violations are contrary to clearly established law.
224
Nor is it enough to say, more specifically, that case law clearly establishes that the excessive use of force in making an arrest is unconstitutional and therefore all excessive force violations are clearly-established-law violations. 225 The more general the relevant precedents, the more obvious the violation needs to be.
226
This framework makes it hard to find a roadmap to the denial of immunity that could give a lower court confidence in its conclusion. Because the Court's maps have nearly all been leading in the other direction, it becomes harder for lower courts to recognize a violation of clearly established law.
On top of that, because lower courts are somewhat regularly reversed for erring on the side of liability, but almost never reversed for erring on the side of immunity, the current docket signals to lower courts that they should drift toward immunity. My tally of immunity cases, if anything, understates the strength of that signal by omitting the many other cases where the Court found an official's conduct affirmatively lawful, thereby mooting the need to reach immunity. 227 Moreover, the signal sent by these results is not accidental. The Court's decision to grant certiorari in these cases almost always previews the merits: all but two of the Court's awards of qualified immunity reversed the lower court's denial of immunity below. 228 In other words, lower courts that follow Supreme Court doctrine should get the message: think twice before allowing a government official to be sued for unconstitutional conduct.
Second, a series of Supreme Court decisions have also given qualified immunity special status as a matter of civil procedure. An official is entitled to consideration of a motion to dismiss before any discovery, contrary to a district court's normal discretion to decide the timing of discovery and a motion to dismiss. 229 An official is also entitled to an immediate appeal of the denial of that motion to dismiss, contrary to the normal rule that such denials are not appealable. 230 Finally, an official is entitled to a second immediate appeal if his motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is likewise denied. 231 These latter two rules stem from the so-called collateral order doctrine established in 1949 by Cohen v. Beneficial Industry Loan.
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More recently, the Court suggested that the collateral order doctrine should not be extended 233 and admitted that the doctrine "may have expanded beyond the limits dictated by its internal logic." 234 Still, the Court has noted "the applicability of the doctrine in the context of qualified-immunity claims is well established." 235 And it has found time for a number of decisions about the scope of these interlocutory appeal rights. 236 Third, and finally, qualified immunity cases receive special privilege in the certiorari process.
The Supreme Court decides five to six cases every year in a special fashion called summary reversal. Unlike the sixty to eighty "merits cases" that are decided after extensive briefing and oral argument, the summary reversal cases are decided solely on the basis of the lower court proceeding and the certiorari papers. In essence, this requires the lower court decision to be so obviously wrong that the Court can rush to judgment, and sufficiently important that it is worth the Court's scarce attention despite the usual rule against "error correction." 237 In a 2015 article on what I called the Court's "shadow docket," I attempted to count which categories of errors had been targeted for repeated attention by the Court's summary reversal docket. The five seemingly special categories were: (1) refusals to uphold arbitration agreements, (2) failures to give district courts sentencing discretion under Booker, (3) grants of habeas corpus relief despite AEDPA, (4) grants of habeas relief where AEDPA was irrelevant, and (5) liability under Section 1983.
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The ad hoc threshold for those "special" categories was at least three cases, approximating 5 percent of the summary reversal docket.
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At the time, it was not clear if qualified immunity made the list because only two of the three summary reversals of Section 1983 liability involved immunity. In the time since The Shadow Docket was published, however, it has become clear that qualified immunity is special. The Court has since added four more qualified-immunity summary reversals, bringing the total above any nonhabeas category. 240 After one of those summary reversals, the Court also summarily remanded, or "GVRed," three other qualified immunity cases for reconsideration in light of the summary reversal, hinting that their analysis was wrong and creating a multiplier effect.
241
All of this is unusual. The Court's normal criteria for certiorari favor cases in which there is a split between lower courts or an important legal error. And the Court has specifically noted that fact-bound applications of existing law are generally unlikely to qualify as important enough for certiorari. 242 But most of the Court's qualified immunity decisions are just fact-bound applications of the already-established principle that liability requires clearly established law. So only a special dispensation from the normal principles of certiorari explains the Court's qualified immunity docket.
Indeed, the Court has now explicitly acknowledged that qualified immunity has such a privileged status. In the 2015 case of San Francisco v. Sheehan, police officers successfully petitioned for certiorari after the Ninth Circuit held that their conduct during an arrest violated both the Americans with Disabilities Act and clearly established law under the Fourth Amendment. It was the former question that had split the circuits, but the officers backtracked and refused to challenge the most controversial part of the Ninth Circuit's holding. 243 The Court therefore dismissed that part of the case as improvidently granted. Curiously, however, it did not dismiss the other question about qualified immunity, even though there was no more of a circuit split implicated by that question. This prompted Justices Scalia and Kagan to dissent, arguing that the qualified immunity question would not have merited certiorari on its own and therefore there was no reason to keep it around. 244 This dissent in turn provoked a footnote from the majority, which said that " [b] ecause of the importance of qualified immunity 'to society as a whole,' the Court often corrects lower courts when they wrongly subject individual officers to liability." 245 This new justification for certiorari might suggest an even bigger rise in the Court's immunity-protection docket.
The Court's enthusiasm for qualified immunity does not seem to be flagging. Two weeks after Sheehan, the Court granted certiorari and summarily reversed another denial of qualified immunity with no dissent noted. 246 In November 2015, it summarily reversed another over Justice Sotomayor's dissent. 247 In January 2017, the Court summarily reversed yet another denial of qualified immunity, noting that it had "issued a number of opinions reversing federal courts in qualified immunity cases" 248 and that it had "found this necessary both because qualified immunity is important to 'society as a whole,'" 249 and "because as an 'immunity from suit,' qualified immunity 'is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.'" 250 Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion. 251 It is not clear that there is a consistent dissenter from the immunity-protection program. 
